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The Impact of New Justices: The U.S. Supreme Court  
and Criminal Justice Policy  
by  
Christopher E. Smith*  
I. Introduction  
The Supreme Court is an important policy-making institution. In criminal justice,1 for 
example, the high court issues decisions affecting institutions, actors, and processes 
throughout the justice system, from police investigations2 through corrections and 
parole.3 The Court's policy decisions affecting criminal justice are produced by the votes 
of the nine justices who select, hear, decide, and issue opinions in cases. It is widely 
recognized, and probably axiomatic, that the Supreme Court's decision-making patterns 
are determined by the Court's membership at any given moment in history.4 When five or 
more justices support a specific outcome in a case, they can form a majority to produce a 
decision that shapes constitutional law and judicial policy making.5 When one or more 
members of that majority retires or dies, the potential exists for the Court's decisions to 
move in a new direction on that issue if new appointees possess different attitudes, 
values, or judicial philosophies than those possessed by their predecessors.6 Because each 
justice's voting behavior is shaped by his or her attitudes and values,7 the case outcomes 
and judicial policies produced by the Supreme Court are a product of the mix of attitudes 
and values represented among the justices at the moment a particular issue is presented to 
the Court. When the mix of justices changes, so, too, can the constitutional rules that 
shape policy issues. In criminal justice, such rules affect police practices, conditions of 
confinement in jails and prisons, and other aspects of the criminal justice system.8  
Although changes in the Supreme Court's decisions may be caused by issue change and 
by changes in the behavior of individual justices, membership change is generally 
regarded as the most obvious, measurable, and important source of change in 
constitutional law and judicial policy making.9 Scholars study the impact of membership 
change by comparing the Court's decision-making patterns during different eras.10 In 
addition, presidents and senators behave strategically in nominating and confirming (or 
not confirming) Supreme Court nominees based on predictions about a particular 
newcomer's likely impact on important issues.11 Presidents, in particular, seek to shape 
constitutional law and judicial policy making by selecting new appointees whose votes 
and persuasiveness on the Court are expected to move decision making in directions that 
comport with the chief executive's values and policy preferences.12 In the area of criminal 
justice, for example, President Nixon appointed Warren Burger to replace Chief Justice 
Earl Warren in 1969 because he wanted the Court to reduce the scope of criminal 
defendants' constitutional rights.13 Because Burger had a reputation as a "law and order" 
judge, Nixon hoped the new Chief Justice could lead the Court away from the liberal 
decisions and judicial policies produced during the Warren Court era.14  
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In drawing conclusions about the effects of membership change on the Supreme Court, 
scholars usually make gross comparisons of eras delineated by the tenures of chief 
justices. For example, there is a general consensus that "[t]he 'new' [Burger] Court was 
far less supportive of criminal rights than was Warren's [Court]."15 This conclusion can 
be supported by both an empirical examination of the Court's patterns of support for 
individuals' rights16 and by a qualitative examinations of the doctrines and precedents 
produced during each era.17 Although these macro-level comparisons of Supreme Court 
eras provide useful historical perspectives about the development of constitutional law 
and judicial policies, they generally do not shed light on the precise impact of individual 
appointees who changed the Court's composition. In fact, comparisons of eras defined by 
the tenures of chief justices credit single entities (e.g., "the Warren Court") with decisions 
produced by Supreme Courts comprised of very different people. For example, the 
Warren Court of 1954 was quite different from the Warren Court of 1968, because the 
latter Court included six justices (Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall) 
who were not members of the former Court.18 Similarly, the Burger Court of 1982 had 
four justices (Rehnquist, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor) who were not members of the 
Burger Court of 1970.19  
Every new appointee to the Supreme Court generates curiosity and speculation about how 
the newcomer will affect the high court's decisions and concomitant societal policies 
based on judicial interpretation of constitutional law and federal statutes. In order to 
undertake a precise examination of the effects of composition change on the Supreme 
Court, this article attempts to identify, measure, and analyze the impact of individual 
newcomers by examining changes in the Court's criminal justice decisions.  
Traditional analysis of Supreme Court eras overlooks composition changes within those 
eras. However, focusing on individual justices provides a basis for assessing the nature 
and timing of changes in judicial policy making, as well as the effectiveness of individual 
presidents in shaping constitutional law by using their power to make judicial 
appointments. The use of criminal justice issues provides a focus for developing and 
illuminating this experimental analytical approach.  
II. Analytical Approach  
New appointees to the Supreme Court, like any other individual justices, have their 
greatest impact when their votes determine the outcomes of cases.20 By casting a decisive 
vote on a divided Court, a justice may literally make a single-handed decision about the 
direction of constitutional law.21 Because of the potential impact of a single justice's vote, 
possibilities exist for significant changes in constitutional law when new appointees join 
the Court, especially when those new appointees have different values than their 
immediate predecessors.22 However, even if a new appointee possesses different values 
and attitudes than his or her predecessor, those new values have little discernible impact 
on law and public policy unless they help to move the Court in a particular direction.23 A 
new appointee may vote entirely differently than his or her predecessor, but if that vote is 
merely one among two, three, or four dissenting votes or among six, seven, eight, or nine 
majority votes, then the new appointment has not had a measurable impact on the Court 
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other than changing the size of a continuing majority bloc. The size of the Court majority 
supporting a particular precedent, doctrine, or policy may be different, but the addition of 
the new appointee has not created immediate change.  
For example, the replacement of retiring liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall by new 
conservative Justice Clarence Thomas made a dramatic change in the decision-making by 
the occupant of that particular seat on the Court. In the years immediately preceding his 
retirement, Marshall had been the Court's most liberal justice on constitutional rights 
issues by supporting individuals in their battles with the government in nearly ninety 
percent of cases.24 By contrast, Thomas immediately became a consistent member of the 
Court's most conservative voting bloc in his initial terms on the Court.25 Despite the 
differences in their judicial values as reflected in their voting behavior and support for 
individuals' rights,26 Thomas's presence on the Court did not lead to an increase in 
conservative outcomes in civil rights and liberties cases.27 The Court already had a 
conservative majority when Thomas arrived,28 so he could not have the same impact as 
the previous newcomer, David Souter, who replaced liberal Justice William Brennan 
when the Court was more evenly divided.29  
In order to identify the extent to which new appointees changed law and policy, there 
must be an examination of the "polarized" cases in which the Court was so deeply 
divided that the shift of a single vote could determine the case outcome.30 In these cases, 
a new appointee can, in effect, single-handedly determine the outcome of a case by 
deciding which of the opposing four-member blocs to join. If the newcomer joins a bloc 
other than the one which his or her predecessor would have joined, then the newcomer 
has produced change. Thus, as a first step in evaluating the impact of new appointees, all 
5-4 decisions in formally decided criminal procedure cases (using case citations) from 
1957 through 1993 were identified for analysis by using the Supreme Court Judicial Data 
Base.31  
A. Differences Between Departing Justices and Their Replacements  
Newcomers have an impact on the law and policy whenever they are among the five 
members of the majority in a 5-4 decision. In such circumstances, their votes, like those 
of their colleagues in the majority, are essential determinants of case outcomes. If, 
however, the newcomer votes in the same manner as his or her predecessor would have 
voted, then the Court's new composition has not produced doctrinal or policy change. 
Any doctrinal or policy changes resulting from such decisions would stem from the other 
two sources of change, either changing decisions by an incumbent justice or changes in 
the nature of the issues presented to the Court.32 In order for a new appointee to produce 
change, that appointee must vote differently than his or her predecessor would have 
voted. Because it is impossible to know with certainty how a departed justice would have 
voted in any given case,33 an estimate of differences was calculated by comparing the 
voting records of departing justices and their replacements.  
Drawing from the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base, Table 1 shows each justice's 
percentage of support for individuals' claims in formally decided, nonunanimous criminal 
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procedure cases.34 Nonunanimous cases were used because such cases, by dividing the 
justices, presumably illuminate most clearly the differences in justices' attitudes, values, 
and voting behavior.35 Justices with low percentages supported the government most 
frequently and are often labeled as "conservative" in analyses of Supreme Court decision 
making. Conversely, those with high percentages are usually labeled as "liberal" for 
frequently supporting individuals' claims about constitutional rights.36  
Table I  
DIRECTION AND CASE OUTCOME CREDIT FOR NEW JUSTICES based on 
difference between retiring justices' and their immediate successors' support for 
individuals' claims in criminal justice cases, 1957-1993  
Retiree % Support Newcomer % Support Difference Multiplier Direction  
and%credit  
Reed 23 Whittaker 41 +18 3 +54  
Burton 29 Stewart 45 +16 3 +48  
Whittaker 41 White 33 -8 3 -24  
Frankfurter 44 Goldberg 77 +33 3 +100  
Goldberg 77 Fortas 83 +6 3 +18  
Clark 33 Marshall 80 +47 3 +100  
Warren 74 Burger 19 -55 3 -100  
Fortas 83 Blackmun 42 -41 3 -100  
Black 70 Powell 28 -42 3 -100  
Harlan 38 Rehnquist 15 -23 3 -69  
Douglas 89 Stevens 64 -25 3 -75  
Stewart 45 O'Connor 28 -17 3 -51  
Burger 19 Scalia 26 +7 3 +21  
Powell 28 Kennedy 29 +1 3 +3  
Brennan 76 Souter 44 -32 3 -96  
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Marshall 80 Thomas 20 -60 3 -100  
As indicated in Table 1, the new appointee's career percentage of support for individuals 
in nonunanimous criminal justice cases was compared with the departing justice's career 
percentage of support for individuals. If the new appointee's percentage was higher than 
the predecessor's, then the newcomer was more liberal than his or her predecessor in such 
cases, while a lower percentage indicated that the new appointee was more conservative. 
These differences were then used to estimate the extent to which the newcomer could be 
credited with changing outcomes in 5-4 cases.  
Because the justices' career percentages in Table 1 reflected all nonunanimous criminal 
procedure cases, they included decisions in which the Court was not deeply divided but 
merely had one or two dissenters. By contrast, the 5-4 decisions in the universe of cases 
to be examined represent those instances where the Court is most strongly divided. Such 
cases polarize the justices and presumably exacerbate differences between justices who, 
while agreeing with each other in many cases, are not strongly like-minded and may be 
most likely to disagree when the Court is deeply divided.37 Thus a multiplier was 
introduced to reflect the accentuated differences presumably produced in such polarized 
cases.  
A multiplier of three was chosen based on the example of Justice Souter's replacement of 
Justice Brennan during the 1990 term. In previous research, I have argued that because 
Brennan supported individuals' claims so consistently at the end of his career, his 
replacement, Souter, deserved credit for changing case outcomes in all of the Court's 
conservative 5-4 decisions in the term following Brennan's retirement.38 The difference 
between Souter and Brennan in all nonunanimous cases was -32, but if Souter deserved 
credit for all of the conservative outcomes in 5-4 cases, then a multiplier of three must be 
introduced to reflect Souter's 100% credit.39  
B. Credit for Decisive Votes Creating New Outcomes  
All of the 5-4 criminal procedure decisions were evaluated to determine the number of 
cases in which a new justice supplied a decisive (i.e., majority) vote. Each justice's cases 
were counted for the "natural court" period prior to appointment of the next new justice in 
other words, the entire period in which the justice was the Court's newcomer.40 For some 
justices, this time period lasted only one term. For others, it lasted for several terms. In 
instances of two justices appointed during the same year (i.e., White and Goldberg in 
1962, and Powell and Rehnquist in 1971), the justices were regarded as sharing the same 
natural court time period. The cases were analyzed further to determine how many 
decisive votes were delivered by the newcomer in the direction of change identified when 
comparing the new appointee with his or her predecessor.41 As indicated in Table 2, the 
multiplier-determined credit score from Table 1 was used to estimate how many new case 
outcomes were determined by the newcomer's vote. Credited cases were rounded to the 
nearest whole number. These are the number of cases in which the newcomer is 
presumed to have changed the Court's decision by voting differently than his or her 
predecessor would have voted, based on the comparison and adjustment of voting records 
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in Table 1. Souter, for example, was credited with one hundred percent of the 
conservative 5-4 decisions based on his credit score of "-96," while Stewart was credited 
with only half of the liberal 5-4 decisions during his initial natural court era based on his 
credit score of "+48."  
III. The Impact of New Justices on Criminal Justice Cases  
The final column in Table 2 indicates the number of criminal case outcomes directly 
attributable to each new justice. Clearly, the replacement of one justice with a newcomer 
who possesses differing values and policy preferences does not automatically produce 
changes in the Supreme Court's decisions. Chief Justice Warren Burger's treatment of 
criminal justice issues, for example, was significantly more conservative than that of his 
predecessor, Earl Warren (see Table 1). However, Burger's presence on the Supreme 
Court did not immediately impact case outcomes because his liberal colleagues were 
sufficiently dominant to preclude the development of 5-4 cases that would create the 
opportunity for Burger to cast a decisive vote.42 A new justice's impact is determined by 
the Court's composition, not just by the newcomer's  
differences with his or her predecessor. If the Court is not divided on criminal justice 
issues (or other issues), the newcomer's presence will not change the Court's decisions.  
Table 2  
JUNIOR JUSTICES' IMPACT ON POLARIZED CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, 
1957-1993  
Justice Direction # Decisions Credit Score # Credited  
of Change Cases  
Whitaker Liberal 3 +54 2  
Stewart Liberal 6 +48 3  
White Conservative 3 -24 1  
Goldberg Liberal 8 +100 8  
Fortas Liberal 6 +18 1  
Marshall Liberal 2 +100 2  
Burger Conservative No relevant  
polarized cases N/A 0  
Blackmun Conservative 6 -100 6  
Powell Conservative 15 -100 15  
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Rehnquist Conservative 15 -69 11  
Stevens Conservative 2 -75 2  
O'Connor Conservative 22 -51 11  
Scalia Liberal 2 +21 <1  
Kennedy Liberal 0 +3 0  
Souter Conservative 6 -96 6  
Thomas Conservative 4 -100 4  
A. The Conservatizing Impact of Newcomers Since the 1970s  
The largest numbers of decisive votes that changed criminal justice case outcomes were 
cast by conservative justices: Powell (15), Rehnquist (11), and O'Connor (11). The totals 
provide an indication of the direction of Supreme Court decision making during the 
1970s and 1980s when Republican presidents had the opportunity to replace retiring 
justices from the liberal Warren Court era. These figures do not, however, provide an 
accurate picture of the relative impact of various individual justices, because the impact 
of these three conservatives was enhanced by the relatively long periods of time in which 
they were the Court's most junior justices (four years (1971-1975) for Powell and 
Rehnquist, and five years (1981-1986) for O'Connor).  
Table 3 standardizes the justices' impact by dividing each justice's credited cases by the 
number of months during which they each were the Court's newcomer. Thus the figures 
represent the number of cases per month in which the justice, as the Court's most junior 
member, cast a decisive vote in a direction different from that of his or her predecessor. 
For justices who were appointed during the late spring or summer, the number of 
freshman months was calculated from the first month (October) in which the newcomer 
would have taken part in oral arguments and case decisions. As indicated by Table 3, four 
conservative newcomers (Souter, Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun) each had greater 
impact than any liberal newcomer. New liberal appointees generally had only modest 
immediate impacts on the Court's criminal procedure decisions. Thus, from this data it 
appears that the Warren Court's "due process revolution" was generated primarily by new 
decisions from a continuing nucleus of relatively liberal justices. These justices were 
appointed prior to 1957 and reacted in new ways to a progression of cases defining 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. By contrast, several conservative justices 
appointed by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush caused immediate changes in the high 
court's decisions on criminal justice issues. The biggest immediate impact was produced 
by the appointment of Souter, the conservative replacement for one  
of the Court's most liberal justices, Brennan.  
Table 3  
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JUNIOR JUSTICES' RELATIVE DIRECTIONAL IMPACT DURING INITIAL 
NATURAL COURT PERIOD, 1957-1993 (number of credited polarized cases divided 
by number of decision-making months in natural court period).  
Liberal Impact Score  
Goldberg .22  
Whittaker .20  
Marshall .08  
Fortas .04  
Stewart .03  
Scalia .02  
Kennedy 0  
Conservative Impact Score  
Souter .50  
Powell .31  
Rehnquist .23  
Blackmun .23  
O'Connor .18  
Thomas .16  
White .03  
Stevens .03  
Burger 0  
B. Impact on Notable Cases  
An alternative method for assessing the impact of new justices is to add a qualitative 
assessment of the importance of the changed outcomes attributable to the newcomers' 
decisive votes. Table 4 contains a listing of the notable case decisions credited to each 
newcomer.43 Notable cases were identified as those cited in two prominent criminal 
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justice textbooks, Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice44 and The American System of 
Criminal Justice.45 These textbooks were chosen to provide benchmarks for notable cases 
because, unlike law school casebooks or hornbooks that provide encyclopedic citations to 
Supreme Court decisions, they selectively cite cases and include both recent and 
historical precedents of importance. Other methods employed by scholars for identifying 
notable cases,46 such as using highlighted cases from the covers of Advance Sheets of the 
United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition47 would be too inclusive and lack 
the selectivity and perspective of the established authors who produced the chosen 
textbooks.  
When notable cases are highlighted, it becomes clear that several key liberal precedents 
established by the Warren Court were, indeed, determined by the appointment of new 
justices. Newcomer Potter Stewart cast the decisive vote in Elkins v. United States,48 
which eliminated the "silver platter doctrine" and arguably provided an important step in 
laying the groundwork for the Court's monumental exclusionary rule decision in Mapp v. 
Ohio49 one year later. As a junior justice, Arthur Goldberg provided decisive votes in 
Malloy v. Hogan,50 which incorporated the right against self-incrimination, and Escobedo 
v. Illinois,51 which invalidated a confession obtained outside of the presence of defense 
counsel. These crucial building-blocks provided the basis for the controversial decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona52 which rested on the decisive vote of newcomer Abe Fortas. Fortas's 
vote also helped to expand the right to counsel in post-indictment line-ups when the 
Court was deeply divided in United States v. Wade.53  
Conservative newcomers cast decisive votes to shift legal doctrine and judicial policies in 
directions that gave greater flexibility to police and prosecutors. As the junior justice, 
Harry Blackmun's vote created the initial breach in the Miranda doctrine by permitting 
the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes when 
defendants testify.54 Newcomers Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist cast decisive votes 
to permit nonunanimous jury verdicts55 and deny the right to counsel at preliminary line-
ups.56 Justice John Paul Stevens cast a decisive vote to permit prosecutors to threaten 
defendants with additional charges during plea negotiations.57 In later years, newcomer 
David Souter's vote  
changed the standard for judging Eighth Amendment cases concerning prison 
conditions,58 permitted detainees to be held for forty-eight hours prior to probable cause 
hearings,59 and established that coerced confessions could be regarded as "harmless 
error."60 Shortly thereafter, Clarence Thomas provided the decisive vote for quick 
reversal of a double jeopardy precedent established by the Court only a few years 
earlier.61  
C. Implications of Freshman Justices' Impacts  
As indicated by the foregoing examination of 5-4 criminal cases, individual appointees to 
the Supreme Court can have an immediate impact on the Court's decisions shaping 
criminal justice law and policy. The extent of this impact is most clearly revealed by 
comparing the voting patterns of new appointees with those of their immediate 
predecessors. A new justice can, in effect, single-handedly change doctrines by casting 
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votes differently than his or her predecessor, but only when the Court is deeply divided 
over specific issues.  
The Supreme Court's most significant impact on the criminal justice system occurred 
when the Warren Court produced "what can only be described as a constitutional 
revolution, generated by a group of justices who were perhaps the most liberal in 
American history."62 This "revolution" was clearly driven by a core group of justices 
appointed prior to 1957 (Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan), who each supported 
individuals' claims in 70 percent or more of nonunanimous criminal justice cases (see 
Table 1). As indicated by the analysis of 5-4 decisions, this core group received pivotal 
support from new appointees in creating key precedents concerning exclusion of 
evidence, self-incrimination, and right to counsel. In fact, it was literally these four core 
justices, plus a newcomer, that determined the Court's decisions in six of the eight 
notable liberal decisions listed in Table 4:63 Green v. United States,64 Elkins v. United 
States,65 Wong Sun v. United States,66 Malloy v. Hogan,67 Escobedo v. Illinois,68 and 
Miranda v. Arizona.69  
With the exception of Chief Justice Burger, the appointees nominated to the Supreme 
Court by Republican presidents to replace retiring Warren Court justices each impacted 
law and policy in criminal justice. Although every member of the Burger Court was not 
thoroughly conservative on criminal justice issues (see Blackmun's and Stevens's 
percentages in Table 1), each appointee was more conservative than the Warren Court 
justice whom he or she replaced. Thus, each new justice shifted the Court's majority 
further away from vindication of individuals' claims in the criminal justice cases that 
came before the high court. As indicated in Table 4, each of these appointees made key 
contributions to the enunciation of new conservative precedents that were part of an 
accelerating trend toward favoring greater freedom for police and prosecutors to gather 
and present evidence. By contrast, the two justices (Scalia and Kennedy) appointed by 
Republican presidents to replace Burger Court justices (Burger and Powell) had little 
immediate impact. They served essentially to replace the conservative votes of their 
predecessors. Ironically, although they were appointed by an agenda-conscious, 
conservative president, Ronald Reagan, who "engaged in the most systematic ideological 
or judicial philosophical screening of judicial candidates since the first Roosevelt 
administration,"70 they were both marginally more liberal than their predecessors in 5-4 
criminal justice cases (see Table 1).  
Table 4  
JUNIOR JUSTICES' IMPACT BY NUMBER OF NOTABLE POLARIZED 
CASES WITH OUTCOMES DETERMINED BY NEWCOMERS' VOTES, 1957-
1993  
LIBERAL  
Justice Number Cases  
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Goldberg 3 Wong Sun v. United States (1963)  
Malloy v. Hogan (1964)  
Escobedo v. Illinois (1965)  
Fortas 2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
United States v. Wade (1967)  
Marshall 1 Foster v. California (1969)  
Stewart 1 Elkins v. United States (1960)  
Whittaker 1 Green v. United States (1957)  
Scalia 0 N/A  
Kennedy 0 N/A  
CONSERVATIVE  
Justice Number Cases  
Powell 6 (joint) Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 
Johnson v. Louisiana (1972)  
Apodaca v. Oregon (1972)  
Rehnquist United States v. Russell (1973)  
Cady v. Dombroski (1973)  
United States v. Edwards (1974)  
Souter 4 Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991)  
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991)  
Wilson v. Seiter (1991)  
Harmelin v. Michigan (1991)  
O'Connor 3 Hudson v. Palmer (1984)  
New York v. Class (1985)  
California v. Ciraolo (1986)  
Stevens 2 Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978)  
Gannett v. Depasquale (1979)  
Blackmun 2 Harris v. New York (1971)  
United States v. White (1971)  
Thomas 2 United States v. Dixon (1993)  
Graham v. Collins (1993)  
11
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Burger 0 N/A  
White 0 N/A  
IV. Conclusion  
By examining the discernible impact of new appointees in 5-4 decisions, the development 
of law and policy making in each Court era can be better understood. The Supreme 
Court's legacy during any era is not produced in any specific moment, but is built through 
case decisions that develop, change, and eliminate doctrines and policies. All of the 
Court's justices participate in this evolutionary process, but new appointees can play a 
pivotal role in defining case outcomes when their judicial values differ from those of their 
predecessors and they arrive at the high court at a moment when the justices are deeply 
divided about important issues.  
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1. See, e.g., John F. Decker, Revolution to the Right: Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence 
During the Burger-Rehnquist Court Era vii (1992).  
In rapid fire succession, the Warren Court issued opinion after opinion that in one way or 
another increased suspects' rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, avoid 
self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and benefit from various trial guarantees, 
including assistance of counsel and confrontation of the accuser. The net effect of these 
judicial developments was to move the criminal justice system from an institution that 
emphasized law enforcement as the paramount, if not sole, goal to one where due process 
and presumption of innocence concerns were viewed as equally important to the 
conviction of the guilty.  
Id.; see also, Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 2348-
2349 (1993) ("In the Warren Court years, by contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
read to incorporate most of the safeguards in the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, by the mid-
1960s lots of federal claims were available to state convicts, who could petition for the 
writ of habeas corpus in order to vindicate those claims in federal court.").  
2. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Police Professionalism and the Rights of Criminal 
Defendants, 26 Crim. L. Bull. 155, 158 (1990) ("The greatest judicial pressure for police 
reform and professionalization came with the controversial decisions defining criminal 
defendants' rights during the Warren era.").  
3. See, e.g., Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners' Rights, 59 Fed. Probation 
36, 36 (March 1995) ("In the late 1960s, however, the United States Supreme Court 
began to involve itself [in prisoners' rights issues]. Since then, the Supreme Court has 
decided more than 30 cases dealing with the rights of the incarcerated.").  
4. For example, in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court eras, the Supreme Court 
made different kinds of decisions and established a different reputation for liberalism or 
conservatism. The Warren Court (1953-1969) has been regarded as producing "[w]hat 
can only be described as a constitutional revolution, generated by a group of justices who 
were perhaps the most liberal in American history." Thomas Walker & Lee Epstein, the 
Supreme Court of the United States: an Introduction 19 (1993). "By contrast, members of 
the Burger Court [1969-1986] selected cases in order to cut back, if not reverse, the 
[liberal] direction of Warren Court policy-making." David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: 
The Supreme Court in American Politics 205 (3d ed. 1993). As a further contrast, "[t]he 
transformed [Rehnquist] Court no longer sees itself as the special protector of individual 
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liberties and civil rights for minorities." David G. Savage, Turning Tight: The Making of 
the Rehnquist Supreme Court 453 (1992).  
5. Indeed, the formation of a new majority can lead to the swift reversal of precedents. In 
1991, after the appointment of Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court issued a decision 
permitting victim impact testimony in capital sentencing proceedings (Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)), reversing precedents established only two and four 
years earlier. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 
482 U.S. 496 (1987).  
6. See Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court 155 (4th ed. 1992) ("Although shifts in the 
positions of sitting justice can produce major policy changes on the Court, more often 
such changes result from new appointments to the Court. Membership change is probably 
the most important source of policy change on the Court.").  
7. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model (1993) (detailed study of the influences on Supreme Court justices' decision 
making that finds attitudes and values to be the most significant influences).  
8. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the 
Three Phases of the Burger Court, in The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the 
Supreme Court, 1969-1986 143, 145 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) ("Thus, Chief Justice 
Burger announced his retirement just when the so-called Burger Court seemed to have hit 
its pro-police stride at last, just when he and his colleagues were demonstrating, after a 
number of years in which the government had experienced only mixed success, that 
criminal procedure is indeed 'the part of the Court's work most susceptible to swings of 
the pendulum after a change of personnel.'" (citation omitted).  
9. Baum, supra note 6, at 155.  
10. See Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Assessing the Conservatism of the 
Rehnquist Court, 77 Judicature 83 (1993) (study comparing decision-making during the 
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court eras).  
11. See Henry J. Abraham, Justices And Presidents: A Political History Of Appointments 
To The Supreme Court (3d ed. 1992) (a review of the presidential motivations and career 
experiences that led each justice to be appointed to the Supreme Court).  
12. See Baum, supra note 6, at 41 ("Presidents recognize that the capacity of their 
appointees to help shape the Court's policies is among their major legacies."); O'Brien, 
supra note 4, at 65 ("Because justices serve for life, they furnish a President with historic 
opportunities to influence the direction of national policy well beyond his own term.").  
13. Abraham, supra note 11, at 296-97.  
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14. See Charles M. Lamb, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: A Conservative Chief for 
Conservative Times, in The Burger Court: Political And Judicial Profiles 129, 151 
(Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991) ("Although President Nixon was 
undoubtedly disappointed by Burger's decisions on some constitutional issues, surely he 
was proud of the chief's general performance in the area of criminal procedure. . . . The 
chief's sympathetic views toward the prosecution were especially obvious in his criminal 
procedure dissents, which were typically his most forceful and eloquent opinions.").  
15. Walker & Epstein, supra note 4, at 20.  
16. See Thomas R. Hensley, Christopher E. Smith, & Joyce A. Baugh, The Changing 
Supreme Court: Civil Rights And Liberties Chaps. 9-12 (forthcoming, January 1997, 
manuscript on file with the authors).  
17. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 143-68.  
18. Sheldon Goldman, Constitutional Law: Cases and Essays 130 (2d ed. 1991).  
19. Id. at 148.  
20. Justices' impact on case decisions is not limited to the effects of their votes because 
they can also influence case outcomes by, for example, persuading or alienating other 
justices. Baum, supra note 6, at 156-62.  
21. In the controversial right to privacy case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), concerning Georgia's anti-sodomy criminal statute, Justice Lewis Powell intended 
to provide the fifth vote for invalidating the law after oral arguments, but he later changed 
his mind and actually provided the fifth vote for precisely the opposite result. See Peter 
Irons, The Courage of Their Convictions 391 (1988). In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279 (1987), the challenge to systemic racial discrimination in capital sentencing, 
memoranda in Justice Thurgood Marshall's personal papers reveal that Justice Scalia 
accepted the social science evidence demonstrating the existence of racial discrimination 
submitted by death penalty opponents. His acceptance of this evidence should have made 
him cast the fifth vote to invalidate capital punishment in Georgia and  
might very likely have eliminated the death penalty in the United States. For some 
unknown reason, however, Scalia actually cast the decisive fifth vote in support of the 
death penalty and never wrote any opinion explaining why he chose to ignore the 
persuasive evidence of racial discrimination. See Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the 
Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies From the Perspective of Justice Antonin 
Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 1035 (1994).  
22. U.S. Senators and interest groups recognize the looming possibilities for change when 
a new appointee possesses different judicial values than the justice that he or she is 
replacing. This recognition can produce significant differences in the levels of political 
conflict involved in the confirmation processes for various justices. For example, 
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conservative Reagan appointees Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia had very different 
experiences in the confirmation process:  
There are two primary for Scalia's relatively easy confirmation proceedings. First, he was 
regarded as a conservative replacing another conservative, namely Chief Justice Burger. 
Thus Scalia's nomination was not perceived as changing the ideological balance of power 
on the high court. Bork, by contrast, was nominated to replace Justice Lewis Powell, a 
supporter of abortion rights and the architect of compromise opinions approving 
affirmative action in some contexts. Therefore, liberal senators feared that Bork would tilt 
the Court too far in favor of conservative decisions.  
Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Supreme Court's Conservative 
Moment 27 (1993).  
23. Many studies of first-term justices examine each justice in isolation and do not look 
comprehensively at all new justices' impact on law and policy. See Albert Melone, 
Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: The First Two Terms of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, 74 Judicature 6 (1990); Thea F. Rubin & Albert P. Melone, Justice Antonin 
Scalia: A First Year Freshman Effect?, 72 Judicature 98 (1988); John M. Scheb II & Lee 
Ailshie, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the "Freshman Effect," 69 Judicature 9 
(1985).  
Studies that examine more than one first term justice tend to analyze the justices' voting 
patterns and opinion-writing behavior rather than the newcomers' impact on law and 
policy. See Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb II, Reassessing the "Freshman Effect": The 
Voting Bloc Alignment of New Justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921-90, 15 
Pol. Behav. 1 (1993); Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb, II, Freshman Opinion Writing on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 1921-1991, 76 Judicature 239 (1993); Robert Dudley, The 
Freshman Effect and Voting Alignments: A Reexamination of Judicial Folklore, 21 Am. 
Pol. Q. 360 (1993); Saul Brenner, Another Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the 
United States Supreme Court, 16 Polity 320 (1983); Edward Heck & Melinda Hall, Bloc 
Voting and the Freshman Justice Revisited, 43 J. Pol. 852 (1981); see also David W. 
Allen, Voting Blocs and the Freshman Justice on State Supreme Courts, 44 W. Pol. Q. 
727 (1991).  
24. Smith & Hensley, supra note 10, at 86.  
25. During his first term, Thomas's seventy-five percent agreement rate in nonunanimous 
cases with the Court's most conservative justices, William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia, 
formed the basis for the strongest three-member voting bloc on the Court. Christopher E. 
Smith & Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-Term Performance of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, 76 Judicature 172, 174 (1993). During his third term, Thomas's eight-two 
percent agreement rate with Scalia created the strongest two-justice voting pair on the 
Court. Christopher E. Smith et al., The First-Term Performance of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, 78 Judicature 74, 75 (1994).  
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26. In contrast to Marshall's 88.5 percent for individuals in civil rights and liberties cases, 
Thomas initially supported individuals in only 30 percent of such cases. Smith & 
Hensley, supra note 10, at 86.  
27. Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-
Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 Albany L. Rev. 1111, 1126 (1994).  
28. During Thomas's initial term, the Court already had six other justices who supported 
individuals in fewer than fifty percent of civil rights and liberties cases: William 
Rehnquist, 22.7 percent; Antonin Scalia, 22.6 percent; Anthony Kennedy, 36.5 percent; 
Sandra O'Connor, 36.9 percent; Byron White, 37.2 percent; and David Souter, 42.6 
percent. Smith & Hensley, supra note 10, at 86.  
29. Souter cast decisive votes in several cases that would likely have had different 
outcomes if Justice Brennan had remained on the Court. Scott P. Johnson & Christopher 
E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 
75 Judicature 238, 239 (1992). See also infra note 38 and accompanying text.  
30. Studies of appellate courts have shown that cases which divide courts and cause 
conflict can be useful vehicles for analyzing judicial decision making. See, e.g., 
Christopher E. Smith, Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc 
Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 Judicature 133 (1990) (study of en banc 
decisions in federal appellate courts).  
31. The Supreme Court Judicial Data Base is available to scholars through the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. 
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger 
Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 Judicature 103 (1989). 
The universe of cases for this study includes only those classified under the "Criminal 
Procedure" issue area. Criminal justice cases classified under the "Due Process" issue 
area were not included.  
32. Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and Collective Voting Change in the United 
States Supreme Court, 54 J. Pol. 3, 56 (1990).  
33. It is notoriously difficult to conclude with any certainty about how a Supreme Court 
justice will or would have decided a case or issue in which the justice did not or has not 
yet participated in the decision. See Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger, Clouds 
in the Crystal Ball: Presidential Expectations and the Unpredictable Behavior of 
Supreme Court Appointees, 27 Akron L. Rev. 115 (1993) (case studies of justices who 
failed to influence the Court in the manner anticipated by their appointing presidents). 
Although many justices vote in fairly consistent patterns, justices will frequently surprise 
outside observers by voting in unexpected ways on particular issues. See Christopher E. 
Smith, Supreme Court Surprise: Justice Anthony Kennedy's Move Toward Moderation, 
45 Okla. L. Rev. 459 (1992) (analysis of Justice Kennedy's surprising votes to maintain a 
right of choice for abortion and preclude sponsored prayers at public school graduations).  
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34. Cases were defined using published citations instead of docket numbers because 
sometimes several cases with different docket numbers and the same or similar issues are 
decided and announced in a single published-citation case.  
35. Disagreements may exist in unanimous decisions, but unless they are articulated and 
explained in concurring opinions, it is impossible for outside observers to detect and 
assess the nature and scope of the intra-court conflicts.  
36. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 31, at 104.  
37. Every justice agrees with each of his or her colleagues in at least some nonunanimous 
cases during every Supreme Court term. See Smith et al., supra note 25, at 75. However, 
certain patterns tend to emerge in which specific justices tend to agree most frequently 
with only certain colleagues those who apparently share their values about the largest 
number of issues. Id.  
38. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Newcomer on the High Court: Justice 
Souter and the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 21, 39-41 (1992).  
39. In Souter's case, the multiplier also helps to compensate for the gradual liberalization 
of his decision making. See Smith et al., supra note 25, at 77. Souter's career percentage 
in Table 1 is presumably higher than the percentage of liberal decisions in his 
performance as a new justice. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 29, at 239. Although the 
Souter-Brennan comparison provides the basis for the selection and introduction of the 
multiplier, the multiplier obviously does not fit precisely with the characteristics and 
career developments of other paired justices. Further develop  
ment of this analytical technique may produce the need for the development of different 
multipliers for other policy issues or for assessing with greater precision the relationship 
between departing justices and their respective successors.  
One of Justice Souter's seven cases, Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), did not 
appear in the data and is not included in this study. It is apparently classified as a "Due 
Process" case rather than as a "Criminal Procedure" case in the Supreme Court Judicial 
Base.  
40. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural 
Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 Judicature 262 (1992).  
41. "Direction of change" in this context means "liberal" (i.e., more supportive of 
individuals in civil rights and liberties cases) or "conservative" (i.e., more supportive of 
the government in civil rights and liberties cases). See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 31, at 
104.  
42. During Burger's initial term, the Court was still dominated by such liberal Warren 
Court justices as William O. Douglas, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Hugo 
Black. Goldman, supra note 18, at 148.  
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43. United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892 
(1993); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 
(1991); Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 449 U.S. 
279 (1991); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 
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Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1970); Foster v. 
California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Green v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).  
44. Rolando V. Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure: Law and Practice (1995).  
45. George F. Cole, The American System of Criminal Justice (7th ed. 1995).  
46. Varied practices are employed by scholars who disagree about the best method for 
identifying "important" cases. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 29, at 242.  
47. See Harold J. Spaeth, Distributive Justice: Majority Opinion Assignments in the 
Burger Court, 67 Judicature 299, 303 (1984).  
48. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).  
49. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
50. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  
51. 378 U.S. 748 (1964).  
52. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
53. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).  
54. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).  
55. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  
56. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).  
57. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).  
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60. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).  
61. United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849 (1993).  
62. Walker & Epstein, supra note 4, at 19.  
63. In the two other cases, Hugo Black dissented in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967), and Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), and he was replaced in the five-
member majority by Tom Clark and Thurgood Marshall, respectively, in those cases.  
64. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).  
65. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).  
66. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  
67. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  
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